Scotia Fuels Limited

Texaco Canada had been the only supplier Scotia Fuels had relied on in its seventeen years of existence. Now Jim Lawley, Sales Manager for Scotia Fuels, stared down at the August 3, 1988, Globe and Mail newspaper's Report on Business headline: "Texaco Canada Put on Block by US Parent." Jim was in charge of purchasing for Scotia Fuels, and he knew that Texaco was one of only two suppliers in Halifax, Nova Scotia that would supply independents like Scotia Fuels. The other was Esso/Imperial Oil. He realized that a Texaco takeover could spell doom for Scotia Fuels. A takeover by Esso would give it a monopoly in Halifax, and a takeover by a company unwilling to supply Scotia Fuels could be even worse. Scotia Fuels might find itself with only three options: find an out-of-town supplier, establish its own terminal, or sell out to one of the major oil companies. His mind began to race. His father and three co-founders had established Scotia Fuels and built it into a stable and profitable business, and Jim was being groomed for the day when he would be the man in charge. He muttered to himself about foreign giants who rode roughshod over Maritime entrepreneurs, and about governments that claimed to care. He looked down at the paper again. It said the sale of Texaco would be subject to government approval, and he wondered if the government would care about Scotia Fuels' predicament. The only thing he did know for sure was that Scotia Fuels had to prepare itself, and there was no time to lose.

The Company

Scotia Fuels had entered the residential fuel oil business in 1972, one year after S. Cunard and Company had been taken over by the Irving Oil Company. The takeover had had a devastating effect on Cunard's management team. Strategic management decisions had been moved to the Irving head office in Saint John,

This case was prepared by Professor Ray Klapstein of Dalhousie University for the Atlantic Entrepreneurial Institute as a basis for classroom discussion, and is not meant to illustrate either effective or ineffective management.

Copyright © 1990, the Atlantic Entrepreneurial Institute, an Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency funded organization. Reproduction of this case is allowed without permission for educational purposes, but all such reproductions must acknowledge the copyright. This permission does not include publication.

New Brunswick and were being made by people who had never been involved in its operation. In less than a year, four of Cunard's managers had left to establish their own new venture. The four had been the heart and soul of Cunard's management its General Manager, Service Manager, Sales Manager, and Salesperson. They knew the fuel oil business well, and their new venture, Scotia Fuels, almost instantly became the most aggressive player in the industry.

By 1988, Scotia Fuels had become the largest independent residential fuel oil supplier in the Halifax market. It had a management team of five people, and a staff of twenty. The President and Vice-President were two of its founders. The organizational chart is shown in Exhibit 1.

From the beginning, Scotia Fuels focused its attention on quality in service, in product, and in personnel. The culture of the company was built on the theme that a happy customer would be a loyal customer, and loyal customers would be the most important prerequisite to success in the business. Keeping customers happy would require the right kind of personnel: people who would be both friendly and capable. A family atmosphere among personnel was nurtured and reinforced. In addition to applying the traditional criteria of ability and relevant experience, the company took great care to select personnel who had the ability to work well with others, both within the company and outside. Lines of authority within the company were known but not emphasized; managers consistently consulted personnel at all levels and gave them an opportunity to contribute suggestions and ideas. Even though pay levels were consistently above industry norms, the corporate culture at Scotia Fuels reflected a belief that treating all personnel as important members of the team in other ways was equally significant for job satisfaction and performance.

Though it had some sales in the commercial sector, Scotia Fuels targeted the residential fuel oil market in the Halifax-Dartmouth area. Fuel oil was a product that had always been regarded as generic, with little opportunity for innovation to differentiate one supplier from another. Yet, Scotia Fuels found its customers willing to pay a premium for quality. Over the years, Scotia Fuels had always charged more for its product than its competitors, but sales continued to grow each year. Scotia Fuels managed to differentiate itself from the competition by stressing three key points: quality of service, quality of products, and its position as an independent and locally-owned company.

(a) Quality of Service. Although there were other segments to the fuel oil market, notably institutional and commercial, Scotia Fuels steered away from these markets and focused on its strength, i.e., residential fuel oil. It could not compete with the major oil companies on price, and price was the single most important factor in the institutional and commercial segments. Its focus on service included the standard services that were industry-wide, including automatic fill-up and emergency service. In addition, Scotia provided, at no extra charge, annual furnace cleaning and tune-up. Perhaps most significant was Scotia's repair service. While competitors also provided regular and emergency repair service, Scotia was almost unique in the industry in that its repair personnel were members of the Scotia Fuels team. All but one of its competitors used subcontractors who were called in whenever a customer had a problem, and who worked on a commission basis. Although difficult to prove, there was a strong suspicion among customers and in the industry itself that this practice led to unnecessary repair work, and even costly furnace replacement by unscrupulous sub-contractors, at the customer's expense. Scotia Fuels had a well-deserved reputation for good service, at minimum expense to the customer, and attributed this to its practice of not using sub-contractors. Scotia stressed a policy of minimizing repair and replacement expense for the customer, and cultivated a reputation for being completely honest with the customer at all times.

(b) Quality of Product. Scotia Fuels bought its furnace oil from Texaco Canada. It was refined in Dartmouth, across the harbour from Halifax, and delivered by Texaco to a distribution depot in Halifax, for pick-up by tank trucks owned by Scotia Fuels. Texaco's product had always been of the highest quality, and Scotia Fuels had never used any other supplier. In keeping with its policy of complete honesty with the customer, Scotia Fuels made no secret of the fact that Texaco was its supplier and that it felt that Texaco's product was the best on the market.

(c) An Independent Locally-Owned Company. Scotia Fuels was proud of the fact that it was an independent locally-owned company, and promoted itself on the fact that it was owned and operated by people from the Halifax area. Although impossible to quantify, Scotia Fuels was convinced that there was a substantial proportion of the market in the Halifax area that was prepared to pay a premium for the privilege of supporting local entrepreneurs rather that contributing to the profits of gigantic oil companies from outside the area.

Scotia Fuels was an aggressive marketer. While it targeted an area within a twelve-mile radius, it focused primarily on the residential market inside the cities of Halifax and Dartmouth. Its target area was kept relatively small to ensure adequate and efficient servicing of accounts. Although 20% of sales were to commercial accounts, marketing efforts were concentrated on the residential market because of its stability and the important role of customer loyalty. The sales force actively pursued new customers through established contacts in the real estate and moving industries, referrals from existing customers, and "cold calls." In addition, careful attention was paid to ensuring continued good service to established customers. By 1987, sales for Scotia Fuels included 4,500 accounts, it was achieving its goal of an 8% annual increase, and it had received numerous takeover propositions from the major oil companies.

The Industry

The residential fuel oil industry in Halifax was characterized by slow growth, because of sluggish population growth and a large increase in use of electricity as a heating source in new homes. A majority of the new housing constructed in the area after the oil crisis of the early 1970s was designed with electricity, rather than oil fired furnaces, as a source of heating. This was due to a number of factors, including reduced construction costs because of the absence of duct work and furnaces, increased usable space because furnaces were not needed in basements, and a lingering anxiety about oil prices. In addition, a minimal number of existing homes had been converted from oil to electric heat. However, by 1988 electricity was known to be a more expensive heat source than fuel oil and all evidence pointed to an increasing spread between the two, largely attributable to government's gradual removal of subsidies of electricity costs1. There was every reason to expect that the Halifax fuel oil market would remain stable for the foreseeable future, though growth would be very slow.

1 The rapid growth in use of electricity as a heat source was, in fact, largely attributable to a substantial government subsidy, which had been introduced to encourage use of this energy source, produced and marketed by crown corporations.

One characteristic of the industry was seasonality. Sales were minimal in the warm spring and summer months and peaked in the cold months of mid-winter. Monthly sales are shown in Exhibit 2.

The Competition

The years prior to 1988 had been characterized by forward vertical integration into the retail fuel oil market in the Halifax area by the large oil producing companies. By 1988, the industry was dominated by these big players, who had entered the market by either establishing their own retail fuel oil operations or acquiring well-established independents. Although the independents had controlled the majority of the market historically, Scotia Fuels had become an anomaly. Esso, Texaco, Ultramar (which had recently acquired the Eastern Canadian assets of Gulf Oil), Irving, Petro-Canada, and Shell all participated in the industry, directly or through subsidiaries. Two independent discount price operations had entered the market in the preceding two years, but neither had gained significant market share. 1987 sales levels are shown in Exhibit 3.

(a) Esso Home Comfort (Imperial Oil Company of Canada)

Esso, was the largest single retailer of fuel oil in the Halifax market, with 1987 sales in excess of 62 million litres. Although it was not distinctive in its service, marketing, or product, Esso had been in the market for many years and competed almost exclusively on the basis of long-established market strength.

(b) Dartmouth Fuels

Dartmouth Fuels had the second largest market share in 1987, with sales of 30.9 million litres. It had been an independent operator until it was purchased by Ultramar in 1987. Unlike Esso, Dartmouth Fuels had its depot on the Dartmouth side of the harbour, adding significantly to the cost of servicing the larger market in the City of Halifax. Its primary focus was on the Dartmouth market (Appendix A). Dartmouth Fuels was an aggressive marketer, stressing a full range of support services. Like Scotia Fuels, its service and delivery personnel were company employees.

(c) Superline Fuels (Petro-Canada)

Superline Fuels had sales of approximately 24 million litres in 1987. Petro-Canada was the majority shareholder. The bulk of Superline's business was in the commercial sector, and it did not focus on the residential market.

(d) Himmelman Fuels Ltd (Texaco Canada Inc)

Himmelman Fuels was controlled by Texaco. It focused on the institutional market, notably Dalhousie and St. Mary's Universities. It had done little to develop the residential market.

(e) Thermoshell (Shell Canada Ltd)

Shell was a relatively large player in the industry, but paid little attention to the general residential market. Its primary focus was on the Canadian Armed Forces, a significant market in the Halifax area.

(f) S. Cunard and Company/Irving Oil Company

S. Cunard and Company was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Irving Oil Company. Each was operated as an independent unit, but they shared facilities. Irving targeted primarily the commercial sector, while Cunard concentrated on the residential fuel oil market. When combined, fuel oil sales in the Halifax area for Cunard and Irving exceeded those of Esso.

(g) Save On Fuel (Imperial Oil Company of Canada)

Save On Fuel was a recently established discount supplier. In 1987, its second year of operations, Save On Fuel secured 8 million litres in sales, before being taken over by Esso. It sold fuel oil at a discount of approximately 20 per litre.

Given the structure of the industry, and the takeover by Esso, conventional wisdom held that Save On Fuel would be unlikely to secure continued growth.

(h) Discount Fuels

Discount Fuels was a new entrant in 1987. It offered approximately a 30 per litre discount, and was expected to take sales from Save On Fuel but have little impact on any of the other players in the industry.

Sources Of Supply

Fuel oil was refined from crude by the large oil-producing companies. The Halifax area was supplied from two refineries in Dartmouth, one owned by Esso and the other by Texaco, and a refinery in Saint John, New Brunswick, owned by Irving. In addition, Ultramar had an ocean access terminal in Dartmouth, allowing it to bring in fuel oil from outside the area if it wished. Typically, fuel oil was shipped by tanker from a refinery to a storage depot from which it was picked up by delivery trucks and delivered to customers.

Esso served its Dartmouth customers directly from the refinery, and its Halifax customers from a depot in Halifax which it supplied from the Dartmouth refinery. Texaco had a similar arrangement. Irving supplied the Cunard and Irving operations by shipping fuel oil from its refinery in Saint John, New Brunswick to facilities in Dartmouth and to a depot in Halifax. All of Scotia Fuels' remaining significant competitors were supplied by Texaco and Esso, from the Dartmouth refineries and the Halifax depots, under reciprocal supply agreements.2

Scotia Fuels had always used Texaco as its source of supply, though Esso had frequently indicated an interest. Irving had a long-standing corporate policy of not supplying independents. Ultramar's location, in Dartmouth, ruled it out as a viable supply source for Scotia Fuels: using Scotia Fuels' tank trucks to haul fuel oil from the Ultramar terminal to its main market in Halifax would be cost prohibitive, particularly when the time loss associated with moving its trucks through heavy harbour bridge traffic was considered. The net result was that only two of the four local suppliers were feasible sources for Scotia Fuels: Texaco and Esso.

2"Reciprocal supply agreements" were commonplace in the oil business in Canada. They were agreements between oil-producing companies under which one oil company provided its products to another ad company in a region in which the second company had no refining facilities, in return for the second company doing so in a region in which it had refining facilities and the other company did not.

The Public Utilities Board

Pricing in the industry was regulated by the Nova Scotia Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities (PUB) (Appendix B). All prices charged to consumers were limited to a maximum set by the PUB Companies whose prices were regulated by the PUB had the right to apply for increases in the maximum permitted price. The PUB thoroughly analyzed applications, with a view to ensuring a fair and reasonable return while at the same time assuring that the best interests of the general public were being protected. All fuel oil retailers except Scotia Fuels had the same maximum price in the Halifax market. The maximum for Scotia Fuels was set at $0.005 per litre higher than its competitors, in recognition of the additional cost of providing annual furnace cleaning and service at no additional charge to the customer.3 All local fuel oil retailers, except the two small discount price operators, consistently charged the maximum permitted by the PUB to all but very large commercial customers.

The Texaco Sale

Indications were that Texaco Canada would be sold as soon as acceptable terms could be arranged with a suitable buyer. It was expected that the negotiation process would take at least three months, followed by a minimum of three months to secure the necessary approvals from governmental regulatory bodies, and a further three months to implement the ownership transfer. Hence, the worst case scenario faced by Scotia Fuels would require alternate supply arrangements to be in place and operating within nine months.

Four potential buyers had indicated an interest in making the acquisition, and it was apparent that there would be no other bidders. The interested parties included two regional Canadian oil companies, one based in the province of Quebec and the other in Ontario. While neither was engaged in oil and gas exploration, both participated in all other aspects of oil company activities, from refining to retailing. Both had been actively seeking ways to increase their production capacity, and both were seriously interested in expanding into the Atlantic Canada market. For both, acquisition of Texaco had the makings of an ideal transaction: the Dartmouth refinery would provide the sought-after production capacity, and the purchase would bring with it an already-established retailing network. The acquisition appeared to be beyond the financial capabilities of either, but if a buyer could be found to spin off the western Canadian assets of Texaco, the acquisition might be achievable for either one.

3 The additional cost of providing these services at no charge to the customer was actually more than this amount.

The third potential Texaco buyer was a consortium comprised of a small Ontario oil company and a Nova Scotia company, with no experience in the oil business, in search of diversification. Its financial capacity was also limited, but its approach would be the same as that of the first two bidders: sell off the western assets of Texaco to reduce the effective cost of the acquisition, and establish itself in the Atlantic Canada region.

The final potential buyer was Esso. Esso, a member of the Exxon family, was already the largest oil company in Canada. Its very deep pockets made it clear that financing the acquisition would not be a problem. While the impact on the competitive situation in the oil industry would not appear to be a concern for regulatory bodies with respect to any of the other three interested parties, Esso's already-established position as number one in the industry could be expected to sound the alarm to the regulatory bodies if it was to make the takeover.

From Scotia Fuels' perspective, it appeared that a takeover of Texaco by any of the first three bidders could reasonably be expected to leave their position essentially unaffected, at least for a considerable time: none of the three had the financial resources, know-how, or inclination to move into fuel oil retailing.4 A takeover by Esso, though, could have very serious implications for Scotia Fuels. Esso would move from being the largest player in the Halifax fuel oil market to sheer dominance. Refusing to supply Scotia Fuels, in an effort to squeeze it out of the market, would be a possibility. It could agree to supply Scotia Fuels, but in the absence of competing suppliers, Esso would be in a position to dictate price, impose harsh payment terms, and introduce difficult logistical arrangements. Jim Lawley foresaw difficult days for Scotia Fuels if Esso made the takeover.

4 Jim Lawley did, however, foresee a potential problem in the long term: if one of these three did accomplish the takeover and Scotia Fuels did establish a different source of supply, the takeover company would probably enter the local residential fuel business in search of a market for its product.

If Esso did ultimately make the Texaco Canada acquisition, the alternatives for Scotia Fuels would, in all likelihood, be very limited. Its owners could sell the business, or at least a controlling interest in it, to one of the major oil companies. Neither of these possibilities was in any way attractive to anyone at Scotia Fuels: they represented an option that would be considered only if there was no other. A second alternative would be to seek an alternate local source of supply. The only remaining local source of supply was Ultramar. While Scotia Fuels currently served its Dartmouth customers by having its tank trucks fill up at the Texaco refinery and might substitute the Ultramar terminal as a source for those customers, the Ultramar term0inal would not be a viable source for customers on the Halifax side of the harbour. Purchasing from Ultramar to serve the Halifax market could be considered only as an interim measure, to maintain customer service while alternate arrangements were put into operation.5 The third and final alternative would be to establish an alternate source of supply outside the Halifax area. The only genuine possibility along these lines would be to establish its own bulk terminal on the Halifax waterfront, buy fuel oil on the New York spot market, and have it shipped to Halifax by ocean-going Linker. The advantage of this alternative would clearly be that Scotia Fuel's supply would be independent, no longer subject to the interests of its competitors. The disadvantages lay in the substantial capital cost of establishing a bulk terminal, increased operating costs associated with the lease of land and facilities and the carrying of a large fuel oil inventory, and being constantly subject to world price fluctuations. (See Appendix C for costs associated with establishing a terminal.) Jim Lawley realized, too, that establishing a bulk facility of its own would change the nature of Scotia Fuels, adding an entirely new dimension and shifting some of management's attention away from the customer.

The Bureau Of Competition Policy

The Competition Act, Canada, established basic rules to ensure fairness in business competition. The Director of Investigation and Research, head of the Bureau of Competition Policy, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, was responsible for administering the merger provisions of the Competition Act, and bringing matters before the Competition Tribunal on the basis that a merger or proposed merger would be likely to prevent or substantially lessen competition. The Competition Tribunal, composed of a panel of judicial and lay members, had authority to deal with any matters brought before it by the Director, approving or disallowing proposed mergers, or imposing conditions on the parties. Conditions imposed could include divestiture of specified assets.6

5 As noted earlier, transporting fuel oil across the harbour with its tank trucks would be cost prohibitive for Scotia Fuels.

6 "Me purpose of the Act ... is to maintain and encourage competition in Canada in order to:

promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy; ...

ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy ..."

(Quoted from the Annual Report of the Director of Investigation and Research, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, March 31, 1988, p. 1) See Appendix D.

It was evident to Jim Lawley that if Texaco Canada was acquired by Esso, the likely result would be to substantially lessen competition in the fuel oil business in the Halifax area: at the wholesale level, it would eliminate one of the only two suppliers in Halifax; at the retail level, it would either force Scotia Fuels to leave the industry or, at the least, severely restrict its ability to compete effectively. Perhaps this legislation presented another option, but he was not sure.

Jim Lawley looked again at the headline "Texaco Canada Put on Block by US Parent." He knew there was nothing Scotia Fuels could do to prevent the sale. He knew the sale would necessitate a change in Scotia Fuels' supply arrangements. He knew the nature of the change needed would depend on the identity of the buyer. He knew Scotia Fuels could not wait until the sale was announced to develop a plan of action. He also knew what options were available, though he was unsure if Scotia Fuels should present its case to the Bureau of Competition Policy. He did not know what Scotia Fuels should do.

Exhibit 1

Scotia Fuels Limited Organizational Chart, 1988

Source: Company files.

Exhibit 2

Monthly Sales Breakdown, Residential Fuel Oil (%)

Source: Company files.

Exhibit 3

Furnace Oil Sakes, Halifax Metro Area, 1987

Source: Nova Scotia Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities.

Appendix A

Map Of Halifax Metropolitan Area, Indicating Location Of
Refineries And Fuel Oil Distribution Facilities

Source: Company files.

Appendix B

The Nova Scotia Board Of Commissioners Of Public Utilities

1. Extracts from Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 1987:

p. 3:

The Board was founded in 1909 for the purpose of regulating the activities, rates and regulations of the public utilities of the Province. At that time the utilities included water, tramways, electric and telephone companies. Since that time the Board's responsibilities have grown and changed. The Board now regulates not only those operations listed above but commercial freight and courier companies, commercial bus operations, school buses, not-for-profit passenger vehicles, gasoline and fuel oil prices, gasoline and fuel oil outlets, and salvage yards. The Board also acts as the approving authority for changes in automobile insurance rates. There are also numerous specific duties under other statutes.

The Board is responsible for ensuring that the best interests of the general public are maintained through the supervision of all public utilities and other organizations assigned to it..."

P. 9:

"The Board regulates prices in the following categories: Dealer Tank Wagon (the refinery price to dealers), Consumer Tank Wagon (price paid by end users having their own storage facility), Industrial, Wholesaler, and Pump (normal consumer prices plus dealer margin and provincial tax). The prices set by the Board are maximums. The selling price may be less than the limit set by the Board. The maximum price at the pumps is the DTW price plus provincial tax and dealer margin….."

2. Extract from Decision In the Matter of The Gasoline and Fuel Oil Licensing Act and In the Matter of The Application of Imperial Oil Limited ... Seeking Approval for an Increase in the Price of Product:

pp 17 and 18:

"...the guidelines and criteria suggested by the Board...

1. The base period for calculation of the gross margin for marketing and refining was 1984-85. An allowance of 651t per litre has been included to offset the averaging of non-crude costs during the period.

2. Brent crude has been used as a "marker" crude...

6. The Board recognizes an increase in refinery, marketing and distribution costs...

However, any increase must be considered in the light of two other factors, i.e., regional price comparisons and the existence and level of discounting, which is an indicator of the competitiveness of a market ......

The impact of the PUB's policy was to hold gross margin relatively constant over time, with increases in the margin being largely attributable to reduction in the purchasing value of money, due to inflation.


The Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities for the
Province of Nova Scotia Gasoline & Fuel Oil Licensing Divison
Summary of Furnace Oil Sold (in litres)
Five Year Summary

Source: Public Utilities Board.

Appendix C

Costs Associated With Establishment Of A Bulk Terminal At Halifax
Comparison to Current Supply Arrangement

1 Retail price was subject to some fluctuation. The figure given is an estimate of the " average" price.

2 Useful life 20 years.

3 The price paid to the current supplier was approximately equal to the price on the New York Spot Market plus the cost of transportation from New York to Halifax.

4 Fuel oil would be purchased in bulk on the New York Spot Market and shipped by tanker to Halifax. The New York Spot Market price lacked the stability of the price paid to the current supplier. The figure given is an estimate of the "average" price. Fuel oil purchased on the New York Spot Market had to be bought in multiples of 1 million gallons (US), and delivery of the full year's supply would be taken on October 1 (1 US gallon = 3.758 litres).

5. No financing was required under the current arrangement; terms required payment of the supplier within 30 days of delivery. Late paying customers were charged interest at a rate equivalent to that paid by Scotia Fuels to the supplier when payment was not made within 30 days.

Financing would be required if Scotia Fuels was required to carry a fuel oil inventor Assuming it would be able to continue charging interest at a rate equivalent to that paid by Scotia Fuels itself for customers failing to pay within 30 days, inventor carrying costs would relate to the delivered cost of fuel oil in the bulk storage tan 'it the end of the month preceding the end of any given month.

Source: Estimates given by Jim Lawley.

Appendix D

The Competition Review Provisions

1. Extracts from the Competition Act of Canada:

"S. 7(l) Any six persons resident in Canada who are not less than eighteen years of age and who are of the opinion that...

(b) grounds exist for the making of an order... may apply to the Director for an inquiry into such matter..."

"S. 47(l) Where, on Application by the Director, the Tribunal finds that

(a) a person is substantially affected in his business or is precluded from carrying on business due to his inability to obtain adequate supplies of a product anywhere in a market on usual trade terms,

(b) the person referred to ... is unable to obtain adequate supplies of the product because of insufficient competition among suppliers of the product in the market,

(c) the person referred to ... is willing and able to meet the usual trade terms of the supplier or suppliers of the product, and

(d) the product is in ample supply,

the Tribunal may order that one or more suppliers of the product in the market accept the person as a customer within a specified time on usual trade terms..."

"S. 64(1) Where, on application by the Director, the Tribunal finds that a merger or proposed merger prevents or lessens, or is likely to prevent or lessen, competition substantially

(a) in a trade, industry or profession,

(b) among the sources from which a trade, industry or profession obtains a product,

(c) among the outlets through which a trade, industry, or profession disposes of a product...

the Tribunal may...

(f) in the case of a proposed merger, make an order directed against any party to the proposed merger or any other person

(i) ordering the person against whom the order is directed not to proceed with the merger,

(ii)ordering the person against whom the order is directed not to proceed with a part of the merger,


(iii)in addition to or in lieu of the order referred to.... either or both

(A)prohibiting the person... from doing any act or thing the prohibition of which the Tribunal determines to be necessary to ensure that the merger or part thereof does not prevent or lessen competition substantially... "

2. Extract from the Competition Tribunal Act of Canada:

"S.9(3) Any person may, with leave of the Tribunal, intervene in any proceedings before the Tribunal to make representations relevant to those proceedings in respect of any matter that affects that person ......

Source: Competition Act of Canada, Competition Tribunal Act of Canada.